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Abstract
Online bidding strategy is one of the most
discussed topics in online auction research. This
research aims to empirically confirm online
bidding strategies in single-unit auctions and
evaluate these strategies in the context of auction
winning outcome, final price evaluation, and
perceived enjoyment. Both objective and subjective
data of online single-unit auctions were collected to
validate our postulated hypotheses. Our findings
suggest that there are three basic bidding strategies
in single-unit auctions and they indeed have
different impacts on auction biddings.

Introduction
In recent years, online auctions have received wide
acceptance in electronic commerce. This new form
of electronic shopping channel offers advantages of
flexible pricing, convenient access, time saving,
and diversified product offerings [36] that
traditional sales channels could not offer. The
success and popularity of online auctions have
drawn many researchers’ interest in this research
domain. Many researchers have devoted much to
the investigations of such topics as Internet
auctions development [11] [46], auction site
technology and service [24] [40], bidding
behaviour [8] [9] [12] [19] [31], reputation or trust
[4] [22] [27] [40] [41], winner’s curse [6] [33],
mechanisms [16] [23] [25] [28] [39]. Recently,
some researchers performed a meta-analysis of
eighty-three articles on online auctions and
concluded that research on this topic can be
categorised into three major areas – facilitating
factors, consumer behaviour and auction outcomes
[17].
Although much research has been carried
out in an attempt to understand online auctions, not
much effort has been devoted to investigate
bidders’ bidding strategies. Of these limited
investigations, some researchers [10] have
thoroughly studied online bidders using objective
bidding data extracted from Yankee auction
websites. Through the analysis of these objective
data, they found that bidders in Yankee auctions

are not homogeneous in terms of their bidding
behaviors. They also found that different bidding
strategies will generate different auction outcomes,
including winning likelihood and consumer surplus
extraction.
Undeniably, the findings of Bapna et al.
[10] contribute significantly to our understanding
of bidding behavior and bidding strategy in online
auctions. However, the Yankee auction they
studied is one kind of multi-unit auction and
another popular auction type in e-commerce is
single-unit auction. There are some differences
between these two kinds of auctions. For example,
in Yankee auctions, bidders do not only bid on
prices but also on units (can be more than one, but
less than the quantity on auctioned). Bidding takes
place progressively on a predetermined starting
price and bid increment. Bidders with the highest
bids won the auction. If there was a tie on winning
bids and there were not sufficient units for all
winners, the tie would be broken first by price,
second by quantity, and third by time. Single-unit
auction, on the other hand, follows English
auction’s mechanism, which begins with the lowest
acceptable price until no bidder will further
increase the bid. With this auction mechanism,
there is always one unit auctioned at a time and the
winning bidder is always the one with the highest
bid. Hence, time priority is not a concern in singleunit auctions.
With the difference between single- and multiunit auctions, it is thus critical to investigate the
applicability of bidding strategies identified in
multi-unit auctions to single-unit auctions. In
addition, findings based on objective data is limited
in shedding light on the application rationale of
these bidding strategies, their impacts on bidding
outcomes, and their applications in fulfilling
bidding motivations. An empirical survey of
bidders in their adoptions of bidding strategies,
thus, may complement and supplement the
observations derived from objective data. In this
regard, we proposed three research questions to
investigate the bidding strategies in single-unit
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auctions and their impacts on biddings. These
questions are:
1. In single-unit auctions, when bidders bid, do
they really follow different bidding strategies?
2. What are the bidding strategies these bidders
adopt?
3. How do these bidding strategies impact
auction winning outcome, final price
evaluation, and bidding enjoyment?

they investigated. First, they found that the
probability of winning amongst different bidder
types is unequal. Their findings show that
opportunists and sip-and-dippers have the highest
winning likelihood, followed by participators,
evaluators, and agent bidders. They also found that
bidders have different ability of extracting
consumer surplus, led by agent bidders, and trailed
by participators, evaluators, opportunists, and sipand-dippers.

Research Background
A bidding strategy represents a series of
interrelated types of bidding behaviour that a
bidder adopts with a certain purpose or tactic in
mind across different phases of an online auction
[1]. Bapna et al. [8] [9] [10] have studied bidding
strategies using bid time (including the entry and
the exit time) and the number of bids as proxies,
together with the observation of the bidding price.
Based on these criteria, they clustered online
bidders into five categories -- evaluators (early or
middle), participators, agent bidders, opportunists,
and sip-and-dippers. Evaluators refer to bidders
who place just one bid at an early stage (or
sometimes in middle stages) of an auction;
participators are bidders who bid throughout the
auction, thus increasing the price by the minimal
bid increment; agent bidders use online bidding
agents to bid at the minimal level required to outbid
the current highest bidder until the bid exceeds the
reserve price they set earlier; opportunists are late
bidders who act only towards the end of an auction;
and sip-and-dippers bid both in the early stage and
near the end.
The classification shows that different
bidders adopt different bidding strategies.
Evaluators “evaluate” the auction through their sole
bid that is usually increased by a “jump”, bigger
than the minimal bid increment. This bidding
strategy is called “jump bidding” [12] [19].
Participators follow other bidders and increase their
prices by the minimal bid increment. This common
strategy is called ratchet bidding (or nibbling) [15]
[21]. Agent bidders employ online bidding agents
in submitting their bids, which is called agent
bidding [19]. Opportunists only bid near the end of
auctions. The strategy taken by them is believed to
be snipe bidding (or late bidding) [12] [31] [37].
Sip-and-dippers are also believed to adopt snipe
bidding except that they have one bid in the early
stage that is only for getting the time priority in
some multi-unit auctions.
The research of Bapna et al. [10] does not
only identify and describe heterogeneous bidder
types in Yankee auctions, but also examines the
auction outcomes of these bidders. In their study,
winning likelihood and consumer surplus
extraction are the two auction outcome variables

Research Hypotheses
This study aims to identify the bidding strategies
and their auction outcomes in the context of singleunit auctions. Based on literature review, bidders
bid differently in Yankee auctions using different
strategies. These identified strategies will be reexamined in single-unit auctions and extended to
test their impacts on winning outcome, final price
evaluation, and perceived enjoyment. Auction
winning outcome investigates whether a bidder
wins an auction. Final price evaluation is a
winners’ subjective evaluation of her/his final
auction price. Perceived enjoyment assesses the
hedonic effect achieved through auction
participation.
Bidding Strategies
Bapna et al. [10] have found the heterogeneity of
bidders in their investigation of Yankee auctions.
These bidders actually take four basic types of
bidding strategies, including jump bidding, agent
bidding, ratchet bidding and snipe bidding.
Although Yankee auction supports multi-unit
auction and its rules are different from those of
single-unit auctions, we believe that the bidding
strategies identified in Yankee auctions could be
extended to single-unit auctions as well. Hence, we
hypothesize that:
H1a: Online bidders in single-unit auctions, as in
multi-unit auctions, are heterogeneous in
their bidding strategies.
H1b: Single-unit auction bidders, like their multiunit auction counterparts, also adopt similar
strategies in their biddings.
Winning Outcome
Bapna et al. [10] found that bidders with different
bidding strategies have different winning likelihood
in Yankee auctions. Opportunists and sip-anddippers were found to have the highest percentage
of winning their auctions, followed by evaluators,
participators, and agent bidders. Presumably, it is
the bidding strategies that caused a difference in
winning likelihood. Opportunists and sip-anddippers, for example, are more eager to win, thus
motivating them to adopt snipe bidding strategy.
With this bidding strategy, bidders snipe just before
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the end of auctions, leaving other bidders little time
to response, which highly increases their chance of
winning.
Bidders with jump bidding strategy submit bids
that are much higher than required, thus
intimidating their competitors and creating a better
chance for their winning. This strategy has been
found to be preferred by experienced bidders [12]
and effective in auctions with fewer overall bids [3]
[10] [19]. Ratchet bidding, on the other hand,
requires bidders to observe and act continuously
during auctions, thus increasing their commitment
and consequential winning likelihood. Of the four
bidding strategies, agent bidding is the most
mechanical and the least flexible. This strategy also
involves the least commitment, time, and resources
from the bidders, which probably could have a
reverse effect on winning likelihood. Based on the
above findings and discussions, we propose that:
H2: Different bidding strategies have different
auction winning outcomes in single-unit
auctions.
Final Price Evaluation
Bapna et al. [10] validated that bidding strategies
have differential effects on the extraction of
consumer surplus. In multi-unit Yankee auctions,
the winning bidders pay their own winning prices,
which may be higher than the lowest winning price,
called marginal price. The loss of consumer surplus
is thus the difference of the actual price paid and
the marginal price. In single-unit auctions, the
winning bidders pay the actual winning prices that
may be different from the maximum prices they are
willing to pay for the auctions. Therefore, the logic
of consumer surplus still exists in single-unit
auctions, but is conceptualized and calculated in a
different way. If a winning price is lower than what
a bidder is willing to pay, this bidder has a positive
consumer surplus. Given the findings that bidding
strategies have differential effects on the extraction
of consumer surplus, it is believed that bidding
strategies could also have differential effects on the
evaluation of final prices in winning auctions.
Hence, we propose that:
H3: Different bidding strategies result in different
evaluations of final auction prices in singleunit auctions.
Perceived Enjoyment
Different bidding strategies could have different
effects on bidding process and consequence, which
may affect the bidders’ perceived enjoyment during
an auction. For example, sniping other bidders near
the end of auctions could be exciting by offering
just one bid, which could possibly bring success.
Ratchet bidding could also be enjoyable by
following the bids of others continuously and
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closely, which could turn an auction into a game.
Jump and agent bidding strategies may also have
different intensity of ‘fun’. Hence, we propose:
H4: Different bidding strategies result in different
extent of bidders’ perceived enjoyment in
single-unit auctions.

Research Methodology
Instrument Development and Pre-test
This study adopted an online survey approach in
data collection. A three-stage validation process
was performed to ensure the validity and reliability
of our questionnaire. First, whenever possible,
previously validated questions and generally
accepted instrument construction guidelines [14]
[20] [45] were followed. Second, the survey was
pre-tested by four business professors with
expertise in survey research, IS, and auction; and
by six graduate students. The feedback from this
phase resulted in some restructuring and refinement
of the survey to improve its quality and content
validity. Third, a pilot study of the questionnaire
was administered to 25 online bidders randomly
chosen from Taobao.com – a major online auction
website in China. The Cronbach’s alphas for all
question items in this pilot test were above or near
0.80, suggesting adequate reliability of the
questionnaire [32]. The pilot test also resulted in a
few changes in wording and sentence structure,
which improved the survey’s content validity.
Data Collection
Both objective and subjective data in our research
were collected from online bidders randomly
chosen from the completed single-unit auctions in
Taobao.com following a three-stage process. First,
auctions completed recently in Taobao.com were
randomly selected for our survey. Second, six
hundred bidders were randomly chosen from the
bidding lists of these auctions. Only validated
bidders, whose identities have been validated by
Taobao.com, were selected. Third, the chosen
participants were contacted through an online
instant messenger – WangWang, an online tool
provided
by
Taobao.com
to
facilitate
communications among users. The chosen bidders
were sent a brief introduction, including the
research objective and requirements, and an
invitation to participate in our study. They were
also informed of a RMB¥10 reward if they
successfully complete an online survey.
A total of 186 bidders responded positively to our
invitation. They were asked to complete an online
questionnaire hosted in the website of a
professional online survey company. The use of
this service allowed us to deal with the problems of
access control, authentication and multiple

The 9th International Conference on Electronic Business, Macau, November 30 - December 4, 2009

290

Xiling Cui, Vincent S. Lai

responses associated with web-based data
collection [44].
At the end of two months, after two rounds of
reminding messages, 179 bidders completed the
questionnaire. These respondents’ user IDs were
then used to match the IDs of their auction
information recorded in Taobao.com. Both
subjective survey data and objective bidding data
were used to evaluate the research hypotheses
proposed in our study.
Variable Operationalization
The measure of winning outcome was based on
Bapna et al.’s [10] winning likelihood. The only
difference is that winning outcome measures
whether a bidder has won the auction as an
outcome; while winning likelihood measures the
percentage of winning auctions in one group. Final
price evaluation was adapted from Padula and
Busacca’s study [34], which evaluated price from
the dimensions of cheapness, fairness and variety.
However, their study evaluates products that may
have a variety of prices, which differs from our
study that each auction has only one final price
without any variety. Therefore, price variety
dimension was dropped while the other two were
kept. The measures of perceived enjoyment were
adapted from research on hedonic shopping,
including adventure perception [2] and joy
perception [5].

Data Analysis and Results
Respondent Profile
Among the 179 valid respondents, 77.1% of them
are female and 22.9% male. Ninety-five percent of
them are in the age range of between 19 and 38.
They are mostly college/university educated (81%)
and with a monthly income of less than 3000RMB
(71.5%). Their occupations are also widely
distributed, with government employees, free
workers, students, and academics topping the list.
Reliability and Validity Analysis
This study has taken a number of measures to
ensure the validity and reliability of the instrument.
As far as the instrument’s construct reliability is
concerned, a reliability test calculating Cronbach’s
alpha values was performed. The alpha values of
final price evaluation and perceived enjoyment
were 0.909 and 0.865 respectively, which are
significantly above the 0.7 threshold level.
The instrument was further assessed for its
construct reliability using exploratory factor
analysis (EFA). The initial factoring step involved
the application of principal-component analysis to
determine the adequate number of factors to
explain the observed correlations. Kaiser's rule
was then applied to remove the principal

components whose eigenvalues were less than one;
this resulted in a two-factor solution loaded in
accordance with the a priori theoretical expectation.
Next, a two-factor solution was forced by utilizing
orthogonal (Varimax) rotation. Only those items
with factor loadings larger than 0.5 were then used
in further analyses. The results of this two-step
factor analysis are shown in Table 1.
Perceived Final Price
Enjoyment Evaluation
PE1
-.177
.688
PE2
-.139
.711
PE3
.168
.796
PE4
.173
.801
PE5
.320
.738
PE6
.264
.789
FPE1
.079
.790
FPE2
.204
.821
FPE3
.123
.811
FPE4
.130
.892
Cronbach’s alpha
.865
.909
Table 1. The exploratory factor analysis results
The convergent validity of our constructs was also
evaluated through its average variance extracted
(AVE). The AVE values of these two factors are
0.54 and 0.70, all above 0.5, which surpassed the
minimal recommended value. Furthermore, they
are also higher than their shared variance, 0.11. In
conclusion, the tests for both factor loading and
AVE do not show any significant violations,
thereby demonstrating adequate convergent and
discriminant validity of our constructs.

Hypothesis Testing and Discussions
Five hypotheses were postulated in this study. The
first two hypotheses on bidding strategies were
validated with cluster analysis. The remaining three
hypotheses that investigate the effect of bidding
strategies on winning outcome, final price
evaluation, and perceived enjoyment, were tested
with ANOVA.
Cluster Analysis of Bidding Strategies
This study adopted a two-step cluster analysis
method to identify the bidding strategies adopted in
single-unit auctions. In Bapna et al.’s [10]
investigation of bidder types, they selected time of
entry, time of exit, and number of bids (NOB) as
proxies in their cluster analysis. We adapted their
approach and replaced the entry time and exit time
with the sequence number of entry (SNOE) and the
sequence number of exit (SNOX). The rationale for
such changes was due to a large influx of bidders
close to the end of auctions, resulting in many
bidders having close entry time. The use of entry
and exit sequence numbers could eliminate this
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problem, but still preserved the logic of entry and
exit time. In our cluster analysis, we also added a
new proxy – number of agent bids (NOAB) – to
help identify the frequency of agent use as a
strategy. Because our sample auctions have
different number of bids from each other, all
selected proxies (SNOE, SNOX, NOB, and NOAB)
were standardized (divided by the total number of
bids in each auction) to eliminate any adverse
effect on clustering.
In the first step of deriving bidders’
clusters, hierarchical cluster analysis was
performed to generate a hierarchical dendogram
and an agglomeration schedule table. The results
suggest that the percentage of the change of
agglomeration coefficients (the value started to
decrease instead of increase) from 3 cluster to 2
cluster is the biggest and that of from 4 to 3 is the
least, indicating 3 is the most appropriate number
of the clustering. This three-cluster solution of
bidding strategies confirmed our proposal (H1a)
that different bidders use different strategies in
single-unit auctions.
Once the optimal cluster number was
determined, our next step was to conduct a K-mean
cluster analysis to generate this 3-cluster solution.
The results, as shown in Table 2, suggest that
Cluster 1 has the highest number of agent bids and
could be interpreted as agent bidding. Cluster 2 has
high SNOE and SNOX and low NOB and NOAB.
It seems that bidders in this cluster bid late and
infrequently, which are the major characteristics of
snipe bidding. Cluster 3 suggests that bidders in
this category are using ratchet bidding strategy due
to earlier SNOE and more NOB than Cluster 2 but
less NOAB than Cluster 1.
SNOE
SNOX
NOB
NOAB

Cluster 1 Cluster 2
(n=53)
(n=88)
0.314
0.799
0.932
0.964
0.405
0.176
0.143
0.014

Cluster 3
(n=38)
0.242
0.450
0.197
0.058

F-value
173.79**
36.47**
50.77**
241.36**

* Significant at p<=0.1 level
** Significant at p<=0.05 level
Table 2. The Results of the Cluster Analysis
Our cluster analysis suggest that the
strategies identified in the three-cluster solution
shared similar characteristics with those strategies
identified in previous studies [10] [12] [15] [19]
[21] [37], thus supporting our hypothesis (H1b)
that bidders in single-unit auctions also adopt
similar bidding strategies, such as snipe bidding,
agent bidding, and ratchet bidding.
Characteristics of Bidding Strategies
ANOVA analysis was then performed to compare
the means of winning outcome, final price
evaluation, and perceived enjoyment across the
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bidding strategies. The results suggested that the
differences in the means of winning outcome and
perceived enjoyment of the three bidding strategies
were significant, thus supporting hypothesis (H2)
that bidding strategies have differential impacts on
auction winning outcome and hypothesis (H4) that
bidding strategies have differential impacts on
perceived enjoyment. We, however, did not find
bidding strategies to have significantly different
effect on final price evaluation (H3). Therefore,
this hypothesis was not supported in our study.

Conclusions and limitations
This study aims to confirm the research findings of
Bapna et al.’s [10] study on bidding strategies in a
single-unit auction context and explore the impacts
of these strategies on auction outcomes. Our
research findings confirm most of our postulated
hypotheses, which could shed some light on
suggesting avenues for future e-auction
explorations. In addition, we improved the cluster
analysis by modifying and adding proxies to
identify bidder clusters more objectively.
However, this research has its own limitations.
First, the data were collected from one online
auction website, which may cause a bias in
sampling. In future research, data from multiple
auction websites have to be collected for theoretical
validation and confirmation. Second, our sample
size was not large enough for theoretical validation
and development. Future studies should generate a
larger sample size to validate and extend our
research findings.
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